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RESPONSE

A Reply to "Hollow Spaces"
GEORGE A. BERMANNt
JACK J. COE, JR.tt
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZALttt
CATHERINE A. ROGERStttt

This short essay responds to Chip Brower's thoughtful
and meticulous critique' of Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
Restatement Third of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration.2 While we appreciate the concerns
he raises, we disagree with the conclusions he draws both
about the Restatement and the drafting process. We
address here what we understand to be Professor Brower's
major criticisms of the work.
Professor Brower faults the Tentative Draft for
essentially three reasons. First, he deplores what he
considers to be its failure to identify a clear path of
f Jean
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1. Charles H. Brower, Hollow Spaces, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 731 (2013).
2. The authors are the Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of the U.S.
Law of International Arbitration.
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navigation among the three perspectives-domestic, foreign,
and global-that influence the drafting of a Restatement on
an international law subject.3 This is what he appears to
mean by way of the term "drafting standards."' Second,
Professor Brower charges the reporters with deviating from
proper norms of treaty interpretation.' And third, he finds
the reporters to have been similarly disrespectful of proper
canons of statutory construction.' For each of these three
critiques, he cites one example in the Tentative Draft.
Before examining Professor Brower's critique in more
detail, a quick update on the status of the Restatement is in
order. The ALI Council approved Chapter 1 (definitions)
and Chapter 4 (post-award relief) at its meeting in January
2012.' The membership of the American Law Institute in
turn approved Chapter 1 and topics 1-2 of Chapter 4
(general provisions and grounds for post-award relief) at its
annual meeting in May 2012,' and the remainder of
Chapter 4 (topics 3-4: conduct of post-award actions and
correction, modification, and remand of awards) at its
annual meeting in May 2013. Accordingly, both chapters
now constitute the position of the American Law Institute."
A full first draft of Chapter 2 (enforcement of the
arbitration agreement), including blackletter, comments,
and reporters' notes, will be laid before the advisers at their
April 2014 meeting with the reporters."
3. Brower, supra note 1, at 748.
4. Id. at 747.
5. Id. at 794.
6. Id. at 813-14.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012).
8. Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2013).
10. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, BYLAWS, art. 6 (May 2007), available at
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction-about.bylaws.
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

Meeting
Details,
https://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=meetings.detail
&meetingid=193 (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
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To begin with the first critique, we do not share
Professor Brower's view that a Restatement of this sort
must, or even should, adhere to a preordained pathway in
integrating domestic, foreign, and global perspectives on the
subject.12 Each of these perspectives brings something
important to bear on a Restatement of the U.S. law of
international commercial arbitration, whose sources include
international conventions and international law, domestic
statutes, and state and federal common law. But different
issues treated in the Restatement raise different
considerations and touch in differing degrees and ways on
these various sources. We anticipated this in embarking on
this journey and, in our view, our experience with the
Restatement to date only serves to vindicate it.
Consequently, we believe the Restatement benefits from
avoiding a categorical pre-commitment to any single
"pathway."
As evidence of what he contends is a lack of consistent
perspective, Professor Brower cites the Restatement's
treatment of interim measures-and more specifically its
position that interim measures should presumptively be
treated as partial awards that are enforceable under the
conventions." In this connection, he notes, critically, how
the Restatement position changed over time.14 According to
his reading, the Restatement not only lacks a clear
direction, but in this regard is unduly influenced by a selfinterested group of advisers, intent on maximizing
arbitration's efficacy at all costs."
That is by no means the case. First, constancy is not an
end in itself, particularly in a process that is intentionally
designed to be dialogic and to take account of a range of
viewpoints. Individual Restatement provisions come before
advisers and the ALI's members consultative group on
numerous successive occasions, and this is by design. As
12. See Brower, supra note 1, at 748.
13. Id. at 754.
14. Id. at 749-54.
15. Id. at 756.
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such, it is not surprising that the positions taken in the
successive drafts, and the analysis in support of those
positions contained in the reporters' notes, might change
over time. It is thought-and in our opinion rightly so-that
the iterative process by which Restatements are drafted and
approved contributes to their quality. We believe we would
be remiss in our duties as reporters if we did not
incorporate useful comments-such as those made during
the proceedings by Professor Brower-in subsequent drafts.
In considering comments we receive from advisers and
others, we do not tally the votes or conduct popularity
contests. When a position commands wide support, we
necessarily take note, particularly when the support spans
a range of the various groups to which it is presented in the
drafting process. Above all, however, as reporters we are
most attentive to the inherent persuasiveness of particular
positions being advanced or rejected. To that end, after
every meeting, the reporters evaluate and reflect
collectively on the views expressed at the meeting. We
inevitably continue this process of assessment as we revise
subsequent drafts.
A word in this connection on our advisers: the advisers
to ALI projects are generally selected on the basis of their
knowledge and experience in the field, so it is only to be
expected that prominent international arbitrators and
counsel will figure importantly among them." The advisers
also importantly include academics and judges who, by no
means, let the practitioners run the show at advisers'
meetings." We are also counseled throughout the process by
those ALI members who participate in the project's
members consultative group-a group that draws from an
mix of prominent scholars, judges, and
eclectic
practitioners. And of course nothing becomes final until
debated and approved by the Council and the membership,
among which international arbitration practitioners
represent a tiny number." Both of those bodies act with
16. Id. at 736-37.
17. Id. at 737.

18. See id.
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deliberation to help ensure that the Restatement does not
stray too far from a domestic point of view.
Turning back to substance, we note that the position
adopted by the Restatement on interim measures is one
with which Professor Brower actually appears to agree.19
Had we not listened over time to as many voices as we did,
we may not have reached as sound a final conclusion.
But even though Professor Brower seems to agree with
many of the substantive outcomes in the Restatement, he is
not indifferent as to which of the three perspectivesdomestic, international, or global-should be adopted for
this Restatement.2 0 He argues for the Restatement to adopt
a domestic perspective.2 1 In our view, however, the domestic
perspective has largely prevailed. It simply has not
systematically
and completely crowded out other
considerations.
In defining what he means by the "domestic"
perspective, Professor Brower argues that our positions
should in general be those that we anticipate U.S. courts
will be most likely to accept.2 2 We see things somewhat
differently. Of course, on any given issue, the expected
response of courts should be gauged and taken very
seriously into account. And we hope the final version of the
Restatement will be fully embraced and followed by the
courts. But we do not reject a position that we determine to
be sounder merely because we suspect that courts at the
current time might be more likely to adopt a different one.
As Professor Brower points out, Restatements should have a
long shelf life, and that observation sometimes militates in
favor of taking the longer view.23 The dissenting opinion
today that cites the Restatement may well become the
majority view tomorrow. As then ALI director Herbert
Wechsler wrote in his 1966 Director's Report, under the

19. See id. at 758.
20. Id. at 735.
21. Id. at 758.
22. Id. at 809.

23. Id. at 766.
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Restatements":
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In judging what was right, a preponderating balance of authority
would normally be given weight, as it no doubt would generally
weigh with courts, but it had not been thought to be conclusive.
And when the institute's adoption of the view of a minority of
courts had helped to shift the balance of authority, it was clear
that this was taken as a vindication of the judgment of the
institute and proper cause for exultation.24

Professor Brower also implies that we show insufficient

fidelity to Supreme Court jurisprudence.2 5 We agree with
him about the importance of fidelity to the Court's decisions,
but disagree with his view that the Restatement is
insufficiently faithful. On no issue have we taken a position
that is contrary to the Court's present position. And on no
matter that the Court remains to address have we taken a
position that the Court cannot plausibly be expected to take.
Professor Brower offers no example that suggests the
contrary in either of these respects.
Professor Brower's second critique is that we have
deviated from traditional canons of treaty interpretation.2 6
Here the single illustration he identifies is the Restatement
position on the availability of forum non conveniens in
actions to enforce Convention awards.27 We believe that, far
from acting contrary to the precepts of treaty interpretation
set out in the Vienna Convention on Treaties, we have been
faithful to that Convention's suggestion that where a clear
and unambiguous meaning of a provision cannot be
discerned, resort should be had to the treaty's "object and
purpose." The Restatement position reflects the belief that
it is considerably more in keeping with the object and
purpose of the New York Convention, which was to commit
24. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 149
(1969).
25. Brower, supra note 1, at 808-09.
26. Id. at 768-75.
27. Id. at 778-79.
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States to the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards,
to take forum non conveniens off the table than to leave it
there.
We do not delve here into all of Professor Brower's
arguments about whether forum non conveniens should be
available with respect to the enforcement of awards that are
subject to the Conventions. Two points need to be made,
however.
First, Professor Brower apparently thinks that the
award at issue in the Figueiredo case, while "foreign," was
not genuinely "international" such that its recognition and
enforcement should be subject to the Conventions.2 8 This
perspective is, however, inconsistent with the plain text of
the Conventions and their implementing legislation. For
better or worse, the drafters of the New York Convention
departed from the approach of predecessor conventions and
made it apply to "foreign" awards, meaning all awards
rendered on the territory of signatory states, irrespective of
their national or international character.2 9
Professor Brower notes that the Panama Convention is
often interpreted as applying only to "international" not
"foreign" awards, and supports his argument for this more
narrow interpretation of the Panama Convention by
pointing to what he regards as "an anomaly in the Federal
Arbitration Act," which extends the New York Convention's
broader scope by statute to the Panama Convention
awards.3 0 But the approach taken by the Restatement is
consistent with Professor Brower's own preferred mode of
treaty interpretation, which is characterized by high fidelity
to the language of the Conventions and their implementing
legislation." Had the drafters of the New York Convention
intended to graft a local contacts requirement onto the
Convention's recognition and enforcement obligation to
avert the "abuse" that concerns Professor Brower and that
forum non conveniens purportedly addresses, they could
28. Id. at 782-85.
29. Id. at 828.
30. Id. at 787.
31. Id. at 768-69.
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easily have done so.32 But they did not. And had Congress
wanted to adopt the narrower scope that Professor Brower
argues applies under the Panama Convention, it could
have." But it did not. Had the Restatement read into the
New York Convention such a requirement, it would have
deviated both from accepted norms of treaty interpretation
and from the domestic perspective Professor Brower
elsewhere advocates.
Second, we do not share Professor Brower's view that
use of forum non conveniens in connection with the
enforcement of Convention awards can be justified by
analogizing the doctrine to jurisdictional rules, statutes of
limitation, or sovereign immunity, which may limit access
to national courts for enforcement purposes.3 4 We find this
analogy to be inapt. Courts cannot and do not function
without jurisdictional rules. Statutes of limitations were
likely omitted from the Conventions because the drafters
expected that States would supply their own. Nor do
conventions on the recognition and enforcement of awards
necessarily imply complete abandonment of a nearuniversal and age-old notion of sovereign immunity. Unlike
forum non conveniens, none of these doctrines contemplates
granting a court the discretion to refuse to entertain an
enforcement action merely because it finds it opportune to
do so.
We turn finally to Professor Brower's third critique that
the Restatement has also deviated from proper modes of
statutory construction." The reporters, it is claimed, have
substituted what they thought Congress would have wanted
for what Congress actually said." Here, too, he gives a
single example, namely the Restatement's subjecting the
vacatur of Convention awards to the Convention grounds in
32. Id. at 806.
33. Id. at 787.
34. Id. at 803.
35. Id. at 827-29.
36. Id. at 828-29.
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lieu of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Chapter One
grounds.37 As to that issue, according to Professor Brower,
the reporters paid "scant attention to text and extratextual
evidence of Congress's intent" and instead relied "almost
entirely on policy arguments."3 8
We consider that assertion to be unfounded. It is not
enough to say, as Professor Brower does, that the New York
Convention does not itself address vacatur.3 9 That much is
conceded. What we are obliged to examine is what Congress
said when it implemented the Convention. The textual basis
for the Restatement's position is straightforward and
explained clearly in the reporters' notes: that FAA section
207, by requiring a court to "confirm" an award unless it
finds one of the grounds in Article V of the New York
Convention,4 0 uses exactly the terminology that the FAA
uses when addressing the grounds for vacatur."
The reporters' notes also rely on the structure of the
statute as a whole (what Professor Brower calls the
statute's "context"),4 2 a similarly standard interpretative
source. And, as explained in the reporters' notes, the scant
legislative history of section 207 cannot bear the weight
Professor Brower seems to give to it. To assert, as he does,
that the Restatement's position has a "complete absence of
grounding in textual or extratextual sources"43 is in our view
not a fair reading of the document. In concluding on this
point, we note that Professor Brower fails to acknowledge
that this issue has little practical significance under the

37. Id. at 829-30.
38. Id. at 814.
39. Id. at 815.
40. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012) ("The court shall confirm the award unless it finds
one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention.").
41. Id. § 9 ("[T]he court must grant such an order [confirming the award]
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10
and 11 of this title.").
42. Id. at 822.
43. Brower, supra note 1, at 823.
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Restatement because it interprets the Convention grounds
as coterminous with the FAA Chapter One grounds.
In our judgment-and evidently also in the ALI
Council's and ALI membership's (as well as the Eleventh
Circuit's) judgment-reading the implementing legislation
as extending the Convention grounds to vacatur is for these
reasons consistent with the text and structure of the FAA,
even though it is not the only available reading or the one
most popular with the courts. Only recently, a panel of the
Seventh Circuit appears to have rallied to the same view.'
While we of course cannot know how Congress would
resolve this particular question if it were to do so today (and
Professor Brower tells us not even to inquire), we do know
from the unambiguous statutory language that Congress
used in 1925 that it deliberately constructed the statute so
as to make confirmation and vacatur grounds mirror-images
of each other. That is precisely what the Restatement
position achieves for Convention awards made in the United
States. This does not amount to the mere guessing at what
Congress would have wanted that the Court ostensibly
condemned in the Weltover" and Morrison" cases.
In conclusion, let us be clear. We do not maintain that
the positions taken by the Restatement on the three issues
on which Professor Brower bases his critiques are the only
ones that could reasonably have been taken. Certainly,
unlike him, we avoid labeling the positions taken by other
legal scholars as "incorrect" or "mistaken" or "wrong,"
though we may regard as such certain of the legal
authorities upon which they rely. We began this essay
simply by contesting Professor Brower's view that the
Restatement can and must follow a fixed analytic pathway,
a view we would regard as dogmatic. Similarly, while we do
not in principle quarrel with his depiction of the proper
modes of treaty or statutory construction, we do reject his
44. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc., 712 F.3d 1021, 1025 (7th
Cir. 2013).
45. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
46. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).

2014]

A REPLY TO "HOLLOW SPACES"

187

apparent belief that a correct exercise of them can properly
lead to only one-typically strict and, in our view, narrowreading.

